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If a wireless sensor network (WSN) is deployed in a hostile environment, the intrinsic limitations of the nodes lead tomany security
issues. In this paper, we address a particular attack to the location and neighbor discovery protocols, carried out by two colluding
nodes that set a wormhole to try to deceive an isolated remote WSN node into believing that it is a neighbor of a set of local nodes.
To counteract such threat, we present a framework generically called detection of wormhole attacks using range-free methods
(DWARF) under which we derive two specific wormhole detection schemes: the first approach, DWARFLoc, performs jointly the
detection and localization procedures employing range-free techniques, while the other, DWARFTest, uses a range-free method to
check the validity of the estimated position of a node once the location discovery protocol is finished. Simulations show that both
strategies are effective in detecting wormhole attacks, and their performances are compared with that of a conventional likelihood
ratio test (LRT).
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are composed of a poten-
tially large number of low-cost and resource-constrained
devices which are often distributed over a wide area. Thus, if
a WSN is deployed in an unfriendly environment, providing
security to the involved network protocols is a challenging
task that usually requires the use of different combined strat-
egies [1].
A protocol that deserves special attention from a security
point of view is neighbor discovery (ND). This is because
one of the most basic requirements in a WSN is the ability of
every node to reliably determine which of the other nodes are
within its radio range so that it can establish single-hop links
with them. Trustworthy ND is a cornerstone for securing
higher-level network protocols and system functionalities,
such as physical and network access control, data routing,
and node localization [2].
In a hostile environment, a WSN can be compromised by
different threats, but the so-called wormhole or relay attack
lies among the most devastating [3]. A wormhole is a high-
speed direct communication link between two malicious
nodes that act in collusion by capturing network packets on
one end, sending them through the wormhole and replaying
them at the other end. Thus, to launch a wormhole attack, an
adversary does not need to infect any network node or break
any cryptographic system, making it a quite severe threat to
WSNs.
Wormholes completely distort the network topology,
making distant nodes to appear as local for a given node
looking for its neighbors. As a side effect of a failed ND due
to a wormhole, most location discovery (LD) protocols will
also be compromised; this is because the wormhole severely
distorts all the measurements related to the relative positions
of the nodes. However, in some cases, the high sensitivity of
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LD protocols to wormholes can be turned into an advantage,
because the localization process can be suitably modified to
detect the presence of an attack.
In this paper we address this approach for the detection
of wormholes. Specifically, we propose a general framework
called detection of wormhole attacks using range-free meth-
ods (DWARF) that has two modes of operation: the first
one (DWARFLoc) performs the detection of a wormhole
simultaneously with the localization procedure, while the
second one (DWARFTest) is a postlocalization detector that
tries to validate the node position after this latter is obtained.
The principles of DWARF are rooted in the exploitation of
the ideas underlying the operation of a range-free localiza-
tion method, namely, the so-called “sensor localization with
Ring Overlapping based on Comparison of Received Signal
Strength Indicator” (ROCRSSI) algorithm [4].
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
(i) The formulation of a simplified attack model for
which the detection of a wormhole can be rigorously
formulated as a binary hypothesis testing problem.
(ii) The derivation of the likelihood ratio test (LRT) as
the asymptotically optimal solution for the wormhole
detection problem. However, the LRT requires a pre-
cise statistical model for the observations.
(iii) The derivation of DWARFLoc and DWARFTest as
robust alternatives to the LRT, because they are not
tied to any particular channel model.
(iv) The evaluation of the relative performances of both
categories of tests (LRT and DWARF) through simu-
lations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews related work concerning wormhole detection.
Section 3 presents basic ideas about range-free localization
and briefly describes the ROCRSSI algorithm. Section 4
defines the particular attack to be counteracted. Section 5
formulates the wormhole detection problem under the
framework of statistical hypothesis testing and derives the
LRT. Section 6 presents the two wormhole detection strate-
gies DWARFLoc and DWARFTest. Section 7 evaluates the
performance of the different wormhole detection strategies
through simulations. Finally, section 8 draws some conclu-
sions.
2. RelatedWork
In recent years, the topic of secure ND has been extensively
studied and a lot of different defensive measures against
wormhole attacks are described in the related literature.
For instance, it is proposed in [3] the use of location and
time stamps, that is, geographical and temporal “leashes”,
attached to network packets to detect wormhole attacks;
therefore, this strategy assumes that all the nodes know their
exact positions and are synchronized in time, which are
probably unrealistic hypotheses if the network is under
attack.
In [5], a wormhole detection algorithm for a multihop
wireless network is presented, based on a search of forbidden
substructures in the connectivity graph.
The authors of [6] present different preventive mecha-
nisms against wormholes and propose an intruder detection
system, LIDeA, in which every node analyzes their neighbors
and collaborates to detect suspicious nodes using a voting
strategy.
In [7], the authors introduce a graph-based and beacon-
less solution that detects wormholes visually by reconstruct-
ing the network topology using only inaccurate distances
between the nodes; however, an irregular-shaped network or
multiple wormholes may lead to an incorrect detection.
The cryptographic concept of “pairing” is introduced in
[8]. The article describes a node-to-node neighborhood au-
thentication protocol based on location-based keys (private
keys of individual nodes that are bound to their identities
and positions), to avoid malicious nodes to join the network.
Wu et al. [9] propose a localization scheme based on
hop counts (DV-Hop) by labeling the neighboring nodes
of beacon nodes according to different algorithms to detect
wormhole attacks; nevertheless, the proposed scheme does
not work well if the network has packet losses or the trans-
mission ranges of all nodes are not identical.
Robust localization techniques were described in [10,
11], using the concept of “verifiable multilateration.” Both
are range-based approaches: while ROPE [10] provides
secure localization and location verification using directional
antennas and distance bounding, SPINE [11] estimates the
distances between the nodes by measuring the time of flight
of the radio signal. These solutions require either perfectly
known directional antennas or specific transceivers capable
of measuring the time of flight.
A secure range-free localization method called SeRLoc
was proposed in [12], where the nodes are supposed to be
equipped with static directional antennas with a fixed com-
munication range, the nodes are localized by overlapping
regions within communication range, and the wormholes are
detected by checking the properties of message uniqueness
and communication range violation. HiRLoc [13] is the
evolution of SeRLoc and provides a high-resolution localiza-
tion by adding two variables to the localization algorithm,
the angle of rotation of the antennas, and the transmission
power, increasing the complexity of the nodes.
Recently, ConSetLoc [14] proposes a robust range-free
localization scheme based on evaluating the relationship
between hops and distances and then applying convex con-
straints in geometry to reduce localization errors induced by
wormholes.
For moving nodes, a secure ND protocol called MSDN
[15] has been proposed, applying the notion of graph rigidity
to aidmoving network nodes in the verification of neighbors.
All the procedures for secure ND described above assume
that the two colluding nodes forming a wormhole are located
within the network deployment area. However, as we will see
in Section 4, the particular threat we will address in this paper
assumes that one of the wormhole nodes is situated out of
the range of the WSN nodes but in the vicinity of an isolated
node which is the target of the attack. So, this particular
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wormhole attack to the LD and ND protocols cannot be
detected by conventional techniques.
3. Range-Free Localization
Traditional localization techniques rely on providing net-
work nodes with auxiliary devices capable of self-acquiring
their coordinates in a geographical reference system, such as
global positioning system (GPS) receivers. Such solutions,
however, have severe drawbacks in terms of their cost and
energy consumption and are unable to operate indoors. A
much more flexible approach to LD is obtained if we assume
that only a small number of network nodes are assumed
to know their own locations (through GPS receivers or
system configuration), while the other nodes are only able
to measure their relative distances to other neighbor nodes
and use these data to position themselves. Focusing on the
physical layer (PHY) level, received signal strength (RSS)
is a parameter readily available in most commercial sensor
nodes, usually in a coarsely quantized form called RSS indi-
cator (RSSI). RSS measurements can be used for localization,
because they are related to the distances between nodes
[16, 17]; however, as they strongly depend on the particular
hardware used and also on often unpredictable environment
conditions, in many cases they cannot be used to directly
estimate distances. Therefore, in recent times several “range-
free” alternatives to localization have been proposed; these
methods use an indirect approach and provide localization
without the need of accurate distance estimations.
We point here that there is some controversy regarding
the expression “range-free” when applied to localization
because, for some authors, this term only refers to techniques
based on connectivity information, which can be interpreted
as a binary quantization of RSS. We will, however, adopt a
broader interpretation of “range-free” schemes as those that
use RSS values but do not rely on the existence of any precise
relationship between RSSs and distances, only assuming
there is a loose link between these parameters [18]. We
will also call these methods “nonparametric,” as opposed to
“parametric” or “range-based” approaches, which require a
precise model relating RSS values to distances.
For instance, if we denote the Euclidean distance between
two arbitrary network nodes at positions x and y as d(x, y) ≡
||x − y|| and the RSS (in dBm) measured at the receiver
of node y for a signal transmitted by node x as r(x, y), a
common basic assumption in many range-free methods is
the validity of a simple monotonicity constraint:
r
(
x, y
)
> r
(
x, y
)⇐⇒ d(x, y) < d(x, y), ∀x, y, z ∈ R2.
(1)
Notice that because the transmitted power is assumed to be
unknown, RSS measurements are not expected to be sym-
metric that is, r(x, y) /= r(y, x). One of the most straightfor-
ward approaches to the solution of the problem of localizing
a node based on the restriction (1) is given by the so-called
ROCRSSI algorithm [4].
This range-free localization method assumes that there
is a node trying to estimate its own unknown position p,
surrounded byN “anchor nodes” located at known positions
a1, a2, . . . , aN . Every anchor node is continuously broadcast-
ing beacon packets that include, along with its own location,
the RSS values corresponding to beacon signals received from
all the other anchor nodes in its vicinity. Therefore, for every
anchor ai (i = 1, 2, . . . ,N) in the neighborhood of p, we will
assume that the following RSS values are available:
One anchor-to-node RSS: r(ai ,p),
N − 1 anchor-to-anchor RSSs: r(ai , a j), for all i /= j.
Now, by applying the monotonicity constraint (1) to this
set of RSS measurements, the localization algorithm obtains
the tightest possible lower and upper bounds, ρ(i)1 and ρ
(i)
2 ,
respectively, for the possible values of the distance between
the ith anchor and the node to be located; this, in turn,
translates to a restriction in the position of the node as a ring
R(ai, ρ
(i)
1 , ρ
(i)
2 ), centered around ai and with inner and outer
radii ρ(i)1 and ρ
(i)
2 ; respectively,
R
(
ai, ρ
(i)
1 , ρ
(i)
2
)
=
{
p ∈ R2 : ρ(i)1 < d
(
ai,p
)
< ρ(i)2
}
,
i = 1, 2, . . . ,N ,
(2)
with ρ(i)1 and ρ
(i)
2 obtained as
ρ(i)1 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
d(ai, am), if ∃r(ai, am)
= inf
{
r
(
ai, a j
)
, j /=i :r
(
ai, a j
)
>r
(
ai,p
)}
,
0, otherwise,
ρ(i)2 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
d(ai, an), if ∃r(ai, an)
=sup
{
r
(
ai, a j
)
, j /=i :r
(
ai, a j
)
<r
(
ai,p
)}
,
∞, otherwise,
(3)
where inf(S) and sup(S) denote the infimum and supremum
of the set S, respectively.
After repeating this procedure for all the anchors, the
node is found to be located on the intersection of a set of
rings R(ai, ρ
(i)
1 , ρ
(i)
2 ), i = 1, 2, . . . ,N , of the form (2); final-
ly, the node position is estimated as the centroid of the
intersection region. Notice that unlike range-based methods,
range-free localization techniques cannot obtain the exact
node position p, even in the absence of measurement errors,
because they only provide bounds for the location; however,
these bounds tend to be tighter as the number of anchors N
increases.
With actual measurements, the condition (1) does not
hold for every pair of nodes because the radio channel is
usually anisotropic, so that not all the rings (2) have a com-
mon intersection. The compromise solution in such cases is
to assume the UN to be in the region of the plane where most
of the rings intersect. This is equivalent to assume that every
anchor “votes” for a given ring as a candidate to hold the
UN, and the region of the plane that gets the higher number
of votes is finally elected. Such voting strategy has the added
benefit of providing a good degree of robustness to attacks
to the localization process triggered by malicious anchors
[19, 20].
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On the other hand, the achieved number of votes (i.e.,
intersecting rings) for the region of the plane finally elected is
also an indicator of the “degree of success” of the localization
process: a high value for this number (relative to its absolute
maximum, i.e., the number of anchors N) implies that
RSS measurements are highly correlated to actual distances
between nodes, so that the monotonicity constraint (1) is
fulfilled in most situations. This fact is illustrated in Figure 1,
where we can see examples of two extreme cases: Figure 1(a)
represents the distribution of the number of votes when the
node to be located receives RSS measurements that are inde-
pendent of distances, while Figure 1(b) illustrates a situation
where RSSs are deterministically related to distances; notice
the presence of a sharp peak in this latter case, highlighting
the area where the node is located.
The ROCRSSI algorithm, unlike other range-free ap-
proaches, does not require any special hardware at the
nodes (like directive antennas) and its implementation does
not depend on parameters that are somewhat imprecisely
defined such as the “communication range,” commonly em-
ployed by range-free methods based on connectivity.
4. AttackModel
We will assume the existence of an adversary who tries
to deceive both the location and neighborhood discovery
protocols by forcing a remote compromised node to appear
as a neighbor of the local network nodes. To accomplish this,
the attacker uses a wormhole link with two endpoints: one
in the vicinity of the anchor nodes, and the other within
the radio range of the compromised node (see Figure 2);
the wormhole local node captures beaconing packets sent
from the anchor nodes and tunnels them to the wormhole
remote node through a dedicated high-speed link, so that
they arrive unmodified at the compromised node. This latter
node, then, applies the localization procedure using these
packets as if they came directly from the anchors, therefore
resulting in a fake position within the deployment area of the
local network. As the wormhole nodes act as simple relays
and do not manipulate the information contained in the
packets, wormhole attacks resist defensive measures solely
based on cryptographic protocols.
Once the compromised node is falsely positioned, the
network can become vulnerable to different exploits. For
instance, the compromised node could inadvertently inject
misleading information into the local network or obtain
sensitive data from other nodes and flow them through the
wormhole link. Another possibility for an adversary comes
from the fact that the wormhole local node can be easily mas-
queraded as an authenticated local node by impersonating
the compromised node; in this way, anyone who physically
bears the wormhole local node could gain access to restricted
areas or secret information [2].
The model of Figure 2, in spite of its simplicity, captures
the essential mechanism of a wormhole attack to LD and
ND protocols. Ironically, however, most existing wormhole
detection schemes cannot cope with this simple attack for
several reasons as follows.
(i) The simple scenario of Figure 2 assumes that in a
normal situation (no attack), all the active nodes are
neighbors; this precludes the use of secure LD or ND
techniques solely based on connectivity information
or hop counts. Obviously, methods for wormhole
detection based on the analysis of “network layer”
parameters (routes, traffic, etc.) are also inapplicable.
(ii) The compromised node only communicates with the
remote wormhole node, so it cannot get cooperation
from “real” neighbors in the localization process or
the detection of the attack.
(iii) A wormhole attack is undetectable by “network-
based” localization techniques [21]: if the position
of the node is obtained from signals received by
the anchors, the compromised node will be always
located at the position of the wormhole local node.
Therefore, the LD procedure should be performed at
the unlocalized node, using data it received from the
anchors, because the unlocalized node is the only one
that can detect inconsistencies caused by a wormhole
attack.
On the other hand, the model of Figure 2 is simple enough to
allow the application of standard tools of statistical decision
theory to the problems of node localization and wormhole
detection.
As a wormhole attack challenges higher-level protocols,
most effective procedures to detect such attacks are based
on looking for inconsistencies in measurements performed
at the physical layer level. In the next sections, we develop
different detection strategies that analyze the RSS values
measured by the nodes interacting in the localization pro-
cedure.
5. Wormhole Detection Using RSS:
Parametric Approach
Any wormhole detection procedure can be stated as a
binary hypothesis testing problem: given a vector of N RSS
observations r = [r1, r2, . . . , rN ]T , we must decide between
hypothesisH0 (no wormhole is present) andH1 (a wormhole
attack is active). However, to formalize the test we need
a suitable statistical description of the observations. In the
sequel, we will use the standard log-distance path-loss model
[22] that links RSS values (in logarithmic scale) to distances
as
r
(
x, y
) = K − 10α log10 d
(
x, y
)
+ e, (4)
where x and y are the positions of the transmitter and
receiver, respectively, K is the mean received power (in
dBm) at unit distance, α is the path-loss exponent (which
depends on the environment), and e is a zero-mean Gaussian
random variable with standard deviation σ (in dB) that takes
into account shadowing effects. Therefore, r(x, y) is also a
Gaussian random variable with standard deviation σ and
mean μ(x, y), with
μ
(
x, y
) = K − 10α log10 d
(
x, y
)
. (5)
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Figure 1: Spatial distributions of the number of intersecting rings with N = 10 anchors. (a) RSS measurements independent of distances.
(b) RSS measurements inversely related to distances.
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Figure 2: Wormhole attack to location and neighbor discovery.
Now, assuming that the observations are independent and
identically distributed (IID), the distribution of r is multi-
variate normal with mean vector µ = [μ1,μ2, . . . ,μN ]T and
covariance matrix σ2I, where I is the identity matrix, so
that the joint probability density function (PDF) of the RSS
measurements is
f
(
r;µ
) = (2πσ2)−N/2 exp
[
− 1
2σ2
(
r− µ)T(r− µ)
]
, (6)
where the superscript T denotes “transpose.” The assump-
tion of IID observations is valid whenever they are associated
to transmitters and/or receivers located at different positions
and shadow fading is spatially uncorrelated.
According to (5), the only parameter of (6) that depends
on the position is µ, so we will formulate the wormhole
detection problem as a test of the mean vector of r:
H0 : µ = µ0,
H1 : µ /=µ0,
(7)
where µ0 is determined assuming there is no wormhole
present.
Now, depending on the origin of the measurements, we
can define two different tests. The first one is carried out
by the unlocalized node, which performs the localization
and wormhole detection processes simultaneously, using RSS
values obtained from packets supposedly transmitted by the
anchors. The second strategy can be applied after the node is
localized and is performed by the anchors, which analyze the
RSS measurements obtained from packets supposedly trans-
mitted by the localized node. Both schemes are presented in
Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.
5.1. Simultaneous Localization and Wormhole Detection: Like-
lihood Ratio Test. In this scheme, the anchors broadcast bea-
coning packets containing their positions, conveniently enci-
phered and authenticated to prevent other kinds of attacks.
These packets are intended to be received by the unlocalized
node, which measures their RSS values and then decrypts
them to obtain the positions of the anchors. As stated
previously, assuming that the statistical model for the RSS
observations (6) is valid, then the wormhole detection
procedure can be formulated as a hypothesis testing problem
of the form (7), where the measurements r= [r1, r2, . . . , rN ]T
are, in our case, collected by the unlocalized node.
Therefore, if the hypothesis H0 (no wormhole) is true,
then the observations are RSS values of packets transmitted
by the anchors at known positions {a1, a2, . . . , aN} (see
Figure 3(a)), so that we have the null hypothesis
H0 : ri = r
(
ai,p
)
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N (8)
and according to (5), the elements of vector µ0 in (7) are
μ0,i = K − 10α log10 d
(
ai,p
)
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N. (9)
However, under H1 (wormhole attack), the packets
obtained by the unlocalized node come from the remote
wormhole node, as shown in Figure 2; therefore, the RSS val-
ues for these packets will be totally unrelated to the anchors
positions We will further assume that the remote wormhole
node “randomizes” the observations (e.g., by changing its
transmitted power) to avoid that they all take the same value
and so circumvent a trivial detection; thus, the assumption
of IID observations also holds true under H1.
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Figure 3: Scenarios for secure neighbor discovery assuming no wormhole is present. (a) Simultaneous localization and wormhole detection.
(b) Wormhole detection after localization.
Notice that, as the position of the node p is unknown,
both H0 and H1 of (7) are composite hypotheses. Therefore,
we can obtain the likelihood ratio test (LRT) [23] as
Decide H1
(
wormhole present
)
iff Λ(r) > η, (10)
where Λ(r) is the likelihood ratio
Λ(r) = maxµ f
(
r;µ
)
maxµ0 f
(
r;µ0
) (11)
and η is a threshold selected so that we have a given proba-
bility of false alarm (PFA). Taking into account (6) and (9),
we have
f
(
r;µ0
)
= (2πσ2)−N/2 exp
[
− 1
2σ2
V
(
p
)]
(12)
with
V
(
p
) =
N∑
i=1
[
ri − K + 10α log10d
(
ai,p
)]2
. (13)
The numerator of (11) is easily obtained, according to
(6), as
max
µ
f
(
r;µ
) = (2πσ2)−N/2 (14)
while the denominator of (11) is, according to (12),
max
µ0
f
(
r;µ0
)
= (2πσ2)−N/2 exp
[
− 1
2σ2
V
(
p̂
)]
, (15)
where p̂ is the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of p
under H0, defined as
p̂ = argmax
p
f
(
r;µ0
)
. (16)
Taking into account the inverse relationship between
f (r;µ0) and V(p), (16) can be also expressed as
p̂ = argmin
p
V
(
p
)
(17)
so that p̂ is obtained as the solution of a nonlinear least
square (NLS) problem. Finding the global solution of (17)
is, in general, a difficult optimization problem because of the
existence of multiple local minima in the objective function.
Therefore, it is customary to resort to simpler suboptimal
alternatives to the exact MLE that guarantee a single local
minimum [24, 25].
Now, taking into account (11), (14), and (15), we can
compute the logarithm of the likelihood ratio as
lnΛ(r) = V
(
p̂
)
2σ2
(18)
so that a test equivalent to (10) is
Decide H1 iffV
(
p̂
)
> η′, (19)
where η′ is another suitable threshold, selected so that
P
[
V
(
p̂
)
> η′ | H0
] = PFA (20)
with PFA the probability of false alarm. The LRT is summa-
rized in Algorithm 1.
We can see from (13) that V(p̂) is the sum of the squared
residuals, so it represents a measure of the “quality” of the
MLE p̂.
5.2. Wormhole Detection after Localization: Likelihood Ratio
Test. Another wormhole detection strategy could be imple-
mented after a given node has completed the localization
procedure, and as a result of this, it has obtained a position
within the local network deployment area. The idea now is
to use the anchor nodes to check the validity of the node
location.
To accomplish this, the localized node broadcasts cryp-
tographically secured packets containing its position p to be
verified. These packets are received by the anchors, which
use them to obtain RSS measurements and the declared
node position. So, in this case, the observations r = [r1,
r2, . . . , rN ]T are collected by the anchors and under H0
(no wormhole), correspond to the RSS values of packets
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Inputs:
Set of trustworthy anchor positions: {ai, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N}
Set of untrustworthy anchor to node RSSs: {ri = r(ai,p), i = 1, 2, . . . ,N}
Parameters of the path-loss model: K and α.
Detection threshold: η′
Steps:
(1) Obtain p̂ as the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of the position of the node using (17) and (13).
(2) Compute the test statistic V(p̂) using (13).
(3) if V(p̂) > η′ then
(4) set wormhole flag ←true
(5) else
(6) set wormhole flag ← false
(7) end if
(8) return wormhole flag and estimated position p̂
Algorithm 1: Simultaneous localization and wormhole detection. Parametric approach: likelihood ratio test.
transmitted by the node at position p and received by the
anchors at positions {a1, a2, . . . , aN} (see Figure 3(b)). There-
fore, we have the null hypothesis
H0 : ri = r
(
p, ai
)
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N , (21)
and according to (5) and taking into account that d(x, y) =
d(y, x), for all x, y, the elements of vector µ0 are also given by
(9).
On the other hand, under H1 (wormhole attack), the
packets received by the anchors are transmitted by the local
wormhole node, as shown in Figure 2; therefore, the RSS
values for these packets will be unrelated to the declared posi-
tion of the compromised node p.
Therefore, the only difference with the previous case is
that now the position of the node p is known, so H0 is a
simple hypothesis and the likelihood ratio is
Λ(r) = maxµ f
(
r;µ
)
f
(
r;µ0
) , (22)
where f (r;µ) and f (r;µ0) are given by (6) and (12), respec-
tively.
Following analogous steps to the previous section, we
arrive at a test similar to (19) but using the reported position
instead of the MLE (see Algorithm 2):
Decide H1 iffV
(
p
)
> η′′, (23)
where V(p) was defined in (13) and η′′ is chosen so that
P
[
V
(
p
)
> η′′ | H0
] = PFA. (24)
Again, the test statistic V(p) is a measure of “goodness of fit”
of the declared position to the observations.
6. Wormhole Detection Using RSS:
Nonparametric Approach
The detection strategies of Section 5 assume the existence
of a well-defined measurement model that describes the
statistical relationship between observed RSS values and
distances. However, in most instances, such model can only
be stated under idealized conditions or is tied to a specific
scenario; in this latter case, estimating its parameters often
requires a costly calibration phase which must be repeated
every time the environmental conditions change.
Therefore, it would be desirable to devise wormhole
detection procedures that are “nonparametric” in the sense
that unlike the test (7), these strategies do not impose a
particular distribution for the observations; thus, such tests
will be robust against departures from any predefinedmodel.
In particular, we will base our derivations of nonparametric
detection schemes on the underlying ideas of the range-free
positioning techniques described in Section 3.
As above, depending on the source of the measurements,
we will derive a procedure for simultaneous localization and
wormhole detection performed by the unlocalized node,
using RSS values obtained from packets transmitted by the
anchors, and a postlocalization wormhole detection scheme
performed by the anchors, employing RSS measurements
obtained from packets transmitted by the localized node.
Both schemes are presented in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, respec-
tively.
6.1. Simultaneous Localization and Wormhole Detection:
DWARFLoc. We can check the presence of a wormhole
without assuming any specific model for the observations by
exploiting the fact that under no attack, the RSS values col-
lected by the unlocalized node will be related to the distances
from the node to the anchors, no matter which is the exact
form of this relationship; on the other hand, if a wormhole is
present, the RSS values measured by the compromised node
are totally unrelated to its actual position.
Thus, under a wormhole attack and assuming that the
compromised node uses the ROCRSSI scheme described in
Section 3 to localize itself, it is very unlikely for the rings
provided by the anchor nodes to share a common inter-
section, even in the absence of measurement errors; so, if
a voting strategy is adopted to estimate the unknown node
position, the number of votes received by any region in the
plane will be well below the maximum attainable score (see
8 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
Inputs:
Set of trustworthy anchor positions: {ai, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N}
Untrustworthy node position: p
Set of untrustworthy node to anchor RSSs: {ri = r(p, ai), i = 1, 2, . . . ,N}
Parameters of the path-loss model: K and α
Detection threshold: η′′
Steps:
(1) Obtain the anchor to node distances {d(ai,p), i = 1, 2, . . . ,N}.
(2) Compute the test statistic V(p) using (13).
(3) if V(p) > η′′ then
(4) set wormhole flag ← true
(5) else
(6) set wormhole flag ← false
(7) end if
(8) return wormhole flag
Algorithm 2: Detection after localization. Parametric approach: likelihood ratio test.
Figure 1(a)). On the other hand, if no wormhole is present,
we should expect that most anchors agree on the existence
of a region of the plane that satisfies the set of constraints
(2); this region, therefore, will receive a high number of
votes (relative to the number of anchors), as Figure 1(b)
illustrates. For these reasons, the test statistic proposed for
this nonparametric detection strategy is the deviation of the
maximum number of votes attained by any region of the
plane from the average number of votes.
Therefore, in this scheme the anchor nodes broadcast
beaconing packets that contain their positions and the RSSs
they measure for packets transmitted by other anchor nodes;
such packets should be conveniently enciphered and authen-
ticated. Then, the unlocalized node collects and decrypts the
beaconing packets and computes RSS values for them (see
Figure 3(a)); these measurements, along with the positions
of the anchors and the anchor-to-anchor RSSs, are used to
estimate the position of the node, via the ROCRSSI method.
The quality of the estimated position is determined by the
number of votes it received, and if this number (after mean
centering) is above a predefined threshold, the localization
process is considered valid; otherwise, an attack is presumed
and the unlocated node refrains from joining the network.
As usual, the detection threshold is selected to obtain a
given PFA. The whole DWARFLoc procedure is described in
Algorithm 3.
6.2. Wormhole Detection after Localization: DWARFTest.
Once the node is successfully located, we can proceed to
verify the validity of the node position p by reversing the
previous roles of the tested node and the anchor nodes (see
Figure 3(b)): now the former broadcasts packets containing
its estimated location, while the latter receive these trans-
missions, compute RSS values, and use them to look for
possible violations of the monotonicity constraint (1). If the
tested node has been compromised by a wormhole attack
like that of Figure 2, the source of those packets will be
the wormhole local node, whose position is, with a high
probability, different from that reported by the compromised
node, so that many of the anchor nodes will find that
the measured RSSs do not agree with the expected ones.
Obviously, beside the anchor nodes, any other node whose
position has been previously validated can also participate in
this wormhole detection procedure. Notice also that the RSS
values collected by the anchors should be transmitted to a
central node in order to process them.
As a measure of dissimilarity between distances and RSS
measurements, we have used a slight modification of the clas-
sical Kendall tau distance [26], which is a metric that counts
the number of pairwise disagreements between two lists. In
our case, the test statistic counts the number of violations
of the monotonicity constraint (1) for every possible pair of
node-to-anchor distances and their corresponding measured
RSS values as
τ
(
p
)=
∣
∣
∣
{(
i, j
)
, i< j :
(
d
(
p, ai
)
<d
(
p, a j
)
∧r(p, ai
)
<r
(
p, a j
))
∨
(
d
(
p, ai
)
> d
(
p, a j
)
∧ r(p, ai
)
> r
(
p, a j
))}∣∣
∣,
(25)
where |S| denotes the cardinal number of a set S.
As the test statistic τ(p) is a discrete random variable
(it only takes integer values), the decision procedure should
include two parameters to exactly obtain a predefined PFA:
an integer detection threshold η and a real number γ (0 ≤
γ ≤ 1), such that
P
[
τ
(
p
)
> η | H0
]
+ γP
[
τ
(
p
) = η | H0
] = PFA, (26)
where PFA is the desired probability of false alarm. The steps
to implement the DWARFTest procedure are illustrated in
Algorithm 4.
7. Simulation Results
We have conducted some simulations to evaluate and com-
pare the performance of the wormhole detection strategies
described in Sections 5 and 6. The simulated WSN is
composed of a set of anchor nodes whose positions are
uniformly distributed in a square room of 20m × 20m.
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Inputs:
Set of anchor positions: {ai, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N}
Set of untrustworthy anchor to node RSSs: {r(ai,p), i = 1, 2, . . . ,N}
Set of trustworthy anchor to anchor RSSs:{r(ai, a j), i = 1, 2, . . . ,N ; j = 1, 2, . . . ,N ; i /= j}
Detection threshold: η
Steps:
(1) Define a grid G of L points in the plane, covering the WSN deployment region and an array V of L counters.
(2) set V ← 0
(3) for every anchor ai, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N do
(4) Obtain a ring R(ai, ρ
(i)
1 , ρ
(i)
2 ) of the form (2) that should ideally contain the node position, using (3)
(5) for every point of the grid g ∈ G do
(6) if g ∈ R(ai, r(i)1 , r(i)2 ) then
(7) Increment counter of votes for point g: V(g)← V(g) + 1
(8) end if
(9) end for
(10) end for
(11) Obtain the intersection region as the set of grid points with maximum number of “votes”:
vM = max
g∈G
V(g)
M = {g ∈ G : V(g) == vM}
(12) Estimate the position of the node as the centroid of the intersection area:
p̂ = 1|M|
∑
g∈M
g
(13) Compute the sample mean of the number of votes:
v = 1
L
∑
g∈G
V(g)
(14) if vM − v ≤ η then
(15) set wormhole flag ← true
(16) else
(17) set wormhole flag ← false
(18) end if
(19) return wormhole flag and estimated position p̂
Algorithm 3: Simultaneous localization and wormhole detection. Nonparametric approach: DWARFLoc.
Inputs:
Set of trustworthy anchor positions: {ai, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N}
Untrustworthy node position: p
Set of untrustworthy node to anchor RSSs: {r(p, ai), i = 1, 2, . . . ,N}
Detection threshold and “PFA adjustment” parameter: η, γ
Steps:
(1) Obtain the node to anchor distances {d(p, ai), i = 1, 2, . . . ,N}.
(2) Compute the test statistic τ(p), using (25)
(3) if τ(p) > η then
(4) set wormhole flag ← true
(5) else if τ(p) = η
(6) set wormhole flag ← true with probability γ
(7) else
(8) set wormhole flag ← true
(9) end if
(10) return wormhole flag
Algorithm 4: Wormhole detection after localization. Nonparametric approach: DWARFTest.
For RSS values, we have assumed the log-distance path-loss
model (4) for which we set α = 3 as a typical value for indoor
environments.
The range-free localization scheme uses a square grid
of 20 × 20 elements, which implies a spatial resolution of
1m in the proposed scenario. The range-based (parametric)
approach uses as an approximation for the MLE the best
linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) of the node position,
because it is much simpler to implement than the exact MLE
and its variance is close to the Crame´r-Rao lower bound [25].
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Awormhole attack is simulated according to themodel of
Figure 2. The distance between the wormhole remote node
and the compromised node, d(w, c), is randomly chosen,
and both nodes are assumed to be located beyond the radio
range of any other WSN node. To avoid a trivial detection,
the remote wormhole node performs random changes in its
transmitted power, so that the RSS values measured by the
compromised node are obtained as
rci = K − 10α log10 d(w, c) + e + ui, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N ,
(27)
where d(w, c) is uniformly distributed between 0 and 20m,
e is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with standard
deviation σ , and {ui, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N} are IID random vari-
ables with uniform distribution in the interval (−6, 6). These
RSSs are first processed by the simultaneous detection and
localization schemes of Sections 5.1 and 6.1.
Once the node has been located, the detection procedures
of Sections 5.2 and 6.2 are started and the tested node begins
to broadcast its estimated position. However, according to
Figure 2, if this node has been compromised by a wormhole
attack, the RSS values measured by the anchors are related to
their distances to the wormhole local node, because this node
is acting as a repeater.
To determine the detection thresholds for the tests,
we have also simulated the scenarios of Figure 3, using a
reference node whose position is uniformly distributed in the
WSN deployment area. Then, for each of the four tests, the
empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the test
statistic is used to obtain the critical value that ensures a given
PFA.
Some results are represented in Figures 4 and 5, where
we have plotted the attained probability of detection for
the wormhole detection schemes of Sections 5 and 6 under
different situations. The PFA is fixed at 0.05 and we conduct-
ed 1000 simulation runs in all cases.
By examining Figures 4(a) and 5(a), we can observe
that the parametric approach for simultaneous wormhole
detection and localization (LRT-BLUE) performs clearly
better than the range-free procedure (DWARFLoc); this was
expected, because range-free localizationmethods do not use
a priori information about any model for the RSS observed
values. However, we can see form Figures 4(b) and 5(b)
that the range-free version of the scheme for detection after
localization (DWARFTest) competes in performance with its
parametric counterpart (LRT) and even surpasses it for high
values of the path-loss standard deviation; this is attributable
to the rapid degradation of the BLUE estimator when the RSS
measurements are subject to significant errors.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we presented a minimalist model for a worm-
hole attack to a WSN that can be effectively counteracted by
two different detection procedures, based on the underlying
ideas of RSS-based range-free localization methods. The
first one (DWARFLoc) operates simultaneously with the
localization procedure, and the second one (DWARFTest)
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Figure 4: Probability of wormhole detection for the proposed strat-
egies with varying number of anchor nodes (PFA = 0.05 and σ =
3 dB). (a) Simultaneous localization and detection. (b) Detection
after localization.
is a postlocalization detector that tries to validate a poste-
riori the estimated node position. Simulations suggest that
DWARFTest has much better detection performance than
DWARFLoc but requires more transmissions to be carried
out.
Furthermore, assuming that the RSS values follow the
standard log-normal path-loss model, we have also derived
exact likelihood ratio tests for the detection of a wormhole,
which can be used as benchmarks for any other detection
scheme.
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Figure 5: Probability of wormhole detection for the proposed strat-
egies with varying path-loss standard deviation (PFA = 0.05 and
N = 40). (a) Simultaneous localization and detection. (b) Detection
after localization.
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